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THE SUPREME COLIRT OF THE. STATF OF l/TAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CASE NO.

15788

DUNG HUNG VO,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant-Appellant was charged in the Third District
Juvenile Court with violating the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated (1953), Section 78-3a-19, in that being "over the
age of 18 years" he did "commit the crime of contributing to
the delinquency of Becky Horton, age 17, a child, under the
age of 18 years, by willfully, intentionally, and unlawfully
harboring Becky Horton, age 17 years, knowing that the said
Becky Horton was a runaway, and by such conduct did tend to
cause the said Becky Horton to become delinquent."

-l -
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Ql~POSITION

IN THE LOWER COURT

Defendant was found guilty after a trial to the Court
and sentenced to serve ninety (90) days in the Utah County
Jail and pay a fine of $150.00.

~fLIEF

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction or failing
that, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Testimony presented at the trial indicated that a juve·
nile, Becky Horton, had run away from home on the 19th day of
September, 1977.

The said juvenile went first to the home of

Nancy Floyd, a girlfriend, and then to the home of another
girlfriend, Kathy Fixell. (R.6)

I

Subsequent to the two stops at the girlfriends home,

t~I

defendant went to an apartment where the defendant resided
with two other Vietnamese males. (R.7)
Prior to the juvenile leaving home on this occassion,
she had run away from home four (4) times. (R.25)

The defen·

dant was not present at the apartment when the juvenile arrivf!
nor did he make an appearance at the apartment for some three:

- 2-
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to four hours after the juvenile had first come to the apartment, at which time the only contact or conversation between
the juvenile and the defendant was that the defendant said
"Hi" to the juvenile. (R.10)

The juvenile was at the apart-

ment for three (3) days and two (2) nights during which time
she only had one conversation of any duration with the defendant which occurred on the second evening that she was at
the apartment. (R.29)

There was never any conversation with

the defendant in which the defendant told the juvenile that
she could stay at the apartment, or gave her permission to
stay at the apartment, or encouraged her to remain at the
apartment. (R.26)

In fact, during the one conversation the

defendant had with the juvenile, he asked her why she was not
at home and encouraged her to go home. (R.24,28,29)
The defendant made no sexual advances toward the juvenile during the time that she was at the apartment, did not
provide food for the juvenile during the time she was there,
did not restrict her movement or prevent her from leaving at
any time, and exercised no control or influence over the juvenile during the time she was at the apartment. (R.26,30)
The State introduced a police report over the objection
of the defendant to establish the age of the defendant as
being over the age of eighteen (18) years.

The objection of

defense counsel was based upon the corpus delecti rule since
-3-
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the information was a result of a personal interview with
the defendant by the police officer.

The prosecution

offered a conversation between the defendant and the juvenile in which certain statements were made by the defendant
during the second night that the juvenile was at the apartment.

Defense counsel objected to the admission of any

statements or admissions made by the defendant upon the
grounds that the State had not established that a crime had
been committed independent of ·the statements of the defendant.
(R.14)

The Court al lowed the statements in, subject to strik·

ing them at a later time. (R. 17)
The defendant moved at the close of the State's case
for a dismissal upon the·grounds that the State had failed
to prove a prima facie case in that there was no evidence
that the defendant had intentionally or knowingly encouraged
the juvenile to run away from home, nor was there any evidence
that he was harboring the juvenile or encouraging her to remain away from her home. (R.34)

The motion to dismiss was

denied by the Court. ( R. 35)
Defendant testified· that he had only met Becky Horton at
the time that she appeared at the apartment which he rented
with the two other Vietnamese. (R.36,40)

He further testified

that he had no prior knowledge that the juvenile was coming to
the apartment or that the juvenile was a runaway until the
-4-
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second evening that she was there. (R.42,39)

The defendant

indicated that he does have difficulty with the English language. (R.47)

The defendant also indicated a lack of under-

standing of the term "juvenile" and the law relative to harboring juveniles. (R.48,49)
The interpreter was sworn and testified that in his
opinion the defendant has a very limited ability to speak and
understand the English language, that the defendant did not
clearly understand the law and further, that in Viet Nam it
was not a crime to help juveniles by giving them shelter.
(R.52,53)

POitlT I
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE
OF THE STATE'S CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
A.

NO ACT OF DELINQUENCY WAS PROVEN BY
THE STATE.

The defendant was charged with a violation of Utah Code
Annotated, ( 1953) Section 78-3a- l 9, in that "the above named
defendant, over the age of 18 years, in the above-stated County,
State of Utah, did on or about the 21st day of September, 1977,
commit the crime of contributing to the delinquency, neglect of
Becky Horton, age 17, a child under the age of 13 yea rs, by
Willfully, intentionally and unlawfully harboring Becky Horton,
age 17 years, knowing that the said Becky Horton was a runaway,
-5-
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and by such conduct did tend to cause the said Becky Horton
to become delinquent."
The act of delinquency alleged to have been committed
by the juvenile and which defendant is alleged to have caused
is the running away of the juvenile from home.

The provi-

sions of Section 78-3a-16, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as
amended, does not provide that the runaway child be subject
to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a result of that
act.

A 1971 amendment to said section, removed the runaway

from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
There was no allegation of any violation of any state,
local, or federal law, nor was there any evidence of any violation of a state, local or federal law on the part of the juvenile introduced by the State.

This fact is apparent from the

Conclusions of Law entered by the Court wherein the Court
stated:
"Based -0n the foregoing facts, the Court concludes that
the female minor child being a runaway was in violation
of the law of this State and the conduct of the defendant, Dung Hung Vo, was such that it did tend to cause
this child·to remain a runaway. That this action was
done knowingly and the Court finds him guilty as charged."
1

The evidence presented at trial by the State was simply
that the juvenile had run away from home, that she stayed for
three (3) days and two (2) nights at an apartment occupied by
the defendant and two other .individuals, and that the defendant
-6-
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knew she was there.
Assuming that the defendant also knew she was a runaway and having that knowledge, he allowed her to remain,
it is apparent that even under those circumstances, he has
not caused her to be delinquent.
U.C.A. Section 78-3a-16.5

provid~s:

"The Court shall have jurisdiction in cases referred to
the court by the Division of Family Services or those
public or private agencies which have contracted with
the Division of Family Services to provide the services
referred to in Section 55-15b-6 (12) where, despite
earnest and persistant efforts of the Division of Family
Services of the contracting agency, the child demonstrates
that he or she:
•
(l)

Is beyond the control of the parents, guardian,
other lawful custodian, or school authorities
to the point that his or her behavior or condition is such as to endanger his or her own
welfare or the welfare of others.

(2)

Has run away from home."

In the present case, there was no evidence presented
which would establish that the juvenile Becky Horton had been
referred to the court pursuant to the statute cited above.
Unless so referred after "oersistant and earnest efforts"
by the Divison of Family Services, the act of running away

from home is not treated as a delinquent act invoking jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
There being no act of delinquency proven, defendantappellant submits his conviction should be reversed.
- 7-
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B.

THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
WHICH, IF BELIEVED, REASONABLE MINDS
COULD HAVE FOUND DEFENDANT GUILTY,
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

At the conclusion of the State's evidence, the defendant-appellant moved the court for a dismissal upon the
grounds that the State had failed to orove a prima facie
case.

The trial court denied the motion.
The complaint charging defendant contains several

elements each which must be proven by the State before a
conviction may be had:
l.

A person over the age of 18 years;

2.

contributed to the delinquency.of Becky Horton,
a child under 18;

3.

willfully, intentionally, and unlawfully harboring the said Becky Horton;

4.

knowing she was a runaway, and;

5.

caused the said Becky Horton to become delinquent.

The State must prove the foregoing elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.

In State v. Taylor, 21 U2d 425, 446 P 2d

g54, this court stated that the prosecution has the burden
of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt on a charge of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor.
Through an admission of defendant as to his age, the
-8.
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State proved the first element and also proved the second
element through the witness Becky Horton.

However, as to

the third, fourth, and fifth elements, the State did not
present evidence, which if believed, would tend to convince
a person of reasonable mind of the guilt of the defendant.
The State failed to present any competent evidence as
to the authority or control of the defendant over the apartment.
At page 16 of the transcript of trial, the Court stated:

"COURT:

That she remained there for 3 days' and
2 nights--uh--I think we should establish
something about whose arartment it was and
things like that I really haven't heard
that yet.

MS. NELSON:

Whose apartment was it?

A:

Uh ... (pause) ... I don't know, I was told
that Dung was just ... "

Defense counsels objection was sustained as to what
the witness was told.

During the rest of the State's presen-

tation, and prior to defendant's Motion to Dismiss, there was
no evidence offered to indicate control of the premises on
the part of defendant.

The evidence only established that

the defendant slept at the apartment the two nights in question along with two unidentified male individuals.

Nor was

there any evidence of any control over the activities or comings
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
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and goings of the juvenile by the defendant. (R.27,28,29).
The Supreme Court of Washington considered a similar
situation in State v. Davis,

558 P 2d 263 wherein the defen-

dant was charged with contributing to the delinquency of
minors by furnishing them with alcoholic beverages.

The

State's evidence established the presence of the defendant
at the house where the juveniles were found.

The Court held

that mere presence in the house without a showing of participative conduct is not sufficient to support a conviction.
Considering the testimony of the juvenile in this case,
to the effect that she had run away four times previously
(R.25), that she had no prior contact nor arrangements with
the defendant and in fact went to two other places prior
to going to the apartment where she was found (R.6,7), and
considering the defendant actually advised her to return
home rather than encouraged her to stay (R.29), it is difficult to imagine a reasonable mind not having

a reasonable

doubt as to the defendant's acts causing the juvenile to
become delinquent.
It is respectfully submitted that the State
failed to prove the elements of the case sufficiently to survive defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

-10-
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POINT I I
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT
"HARBORED" A JUVENILE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-3a-19.
This Court has previously considered the issues presented by the appeal in State v. Macri, 28 U 2d 69, 498 P2d
355, and the defendant-appellant considers that case to be

dis posit i v e of th i s ma t t er .

In Macri , ( supra ) the j u v en i l e

was not induced nor encouraged to leave home by the defendants.

She was simply given shelter.

Defendants were charged

with a violation of U.C.A. 55-10-80(1) which has been redesignated as U.C.A. 78-3a-l9, the statute of which defendant
appellant in the present case stands convicted.
The Court in Macri, (supra) held that the mere act of
providing shelter was not a violation of the statute and
further, that defendants had no duty to investi9ate the age
of the juvenile and notify the parents.

At 498 P2d 356,

the Court stated:
"There is nothing in the record to indicate that during
Robin's stay at the church she engaged in any unlawful
or immoral conduct, nor was she exposed to criminal or
immoral conduct on the part of others. The State contends that the defendants were under a duty to investigate the age and residence of Robin and to notify her
parents or the authorities of her whereabouts. We do
not believe that the statute referred to above imposes
that duty upon the defendants. The simple act of affording shelter to Robin is not a violation of the statute
and it is especially true where Robyn was not induced
nor encouraged to seek shelter at the premises under
control of the defendants."
- 11-
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The evidence adduced at trial by the State failed to
establish a prima facie case against defendant in that
there was no evidence that defendant encouraged the juvenile
to run away from home, the defendant was not informed at any
time as to the age of the juvenile, and further, there were
no unlawful acts or immoral acts engaged in by the juvenile
during the time she stayed at the apartment.
In fact, the State's evidence indicated that the defendant was not at the apartment when the juvenile arrived,
(R. 10),

that the juvenile had had no prior contact with the

defendant (R.8), that the only conversation with the defendant
the first night she was at the apartment was "Hi" (R. 10),
that when he did have a conversation with her the second night
it was then, upon learning she was a runaway, he advised her
to return to her parents (R. 24,28,29), and that the only con·
tact the juvenile had with the defendant was the conversation
on the second night (R.30).

Further, there was no indication

that the defendant knew the juvenile to be under age since
she never informed him of that fact (R. 29).

The defendant did

not have any sexual contact with the juvenile nor did he harm
her in any way (R.30).
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant-appellant urges
the Court to reverse his conviction as coming within this
Court's ruling in State v. Macri, (supra).

- 1 2-

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT Ill
THE TRAIL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT SINCE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE INDEPENDENT OF DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION TO ESTABLISH THE
CORPUS DELECTI.

The juvenile, Becky Horton, was allowed to testify
over the objection of defense, concerning a statement made
to her by the defendant as follows:
" ... he was telling me how he took Cindy somewhere else,
so if I got caught, Cindy wouldn't get caught, or if
Cindy got caught, I wouldn't get caught."
(R.17)
At the time the statement was introduced, the only
evidence introduced by the State was that the juvenile had
gone to an apartment where the defendant was staying without
any encouragement or contact with the defendant, that she
had run away from home, and that she had remained at the
apartment the night previous to the conversation.

At that

point, there was never any evidence that anyone had harbored
the juvenile.
Utah case law is clear that there must be independent
evidence of the crime in order to support a guilty conviction.
In

~ta~_I_rwin,

101 U 365, 120 P2d, 285, the Court

found that:
"In order to support a verdict; the State must prove
the corpus delecti; that is, that a crime was co1m1itted ... and this without the aid of the admissions of
of the defendants themselves."
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See also State v. Knowfler,
State v. Cazier, 521 P 2d 554;

563 P. 2d

175;

Stat~_Wel

12_, 35 UT 400,

100 P 681; and State v. Johnson, 95 UT 572 83 P2d.
Aside from the admission of the defendant, there was
no evidence that the crime alleged to have been committed
had actually occurred.

Defendant respectfully requests

reversal of his conviction for that reason.

CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the court should have granted
defendants Motion to Dismiss for the reasons that no act of
delinquency was ever proven by the State, and further, the
State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict the
appellant.
In addition, the appellant suggests that State v. Macri
(supra) deposes of the issues presented by this appeal and
that the appellant was merely an occupant of an apartment
who had no part in encouraging or inducing the juvenile to
run away from home.
Finally, appellant maintains that there was no independent evidence of involvement on his part aside from his
admissions.
For the above reasons, appellant maintains his convic-

- l 4-

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion should be reversed, or failing that, a new trial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
107 E. 100 South
#29
Provo, UT
84601
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

- l 5-
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